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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-
3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and Supreme Court order of March 18, 1994 
directing this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Did the District Court err in adjudging that the provisions of Article 
V entitled "Grievance Procedure" of the Professional Agreement entered into between 
the Davis Education Association and the Davis County School District on August 18, 
1992, constitute an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The question of whether or not the "Grievance Procedure" contained in 
Article V of the Professional Agreement is an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah 
Arbitration Act (the "Act") necessarily involves a legal interpretation of the Professional 
Agreement and the Act and is not fact-dependent. Accordingly, the legal conclusion of 
the District Court on this point should be reviewed for "correctness" and not be given 
any special deference. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P. 2d 487 (Utah App., 1993); 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P. 2d 1174 (Utah, 1989); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. 
Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah, 1989); State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah, 
1994); Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381 (Utah, 1993). 
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2. Did the District Court err in adjudging that Plaintiff waived his right 
to arbitration? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Determination of this issue is fact-dependent and the Findings of the 
District Court should be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard and all disputes 
in the evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah, 1985); State 
v. Pena, supra; Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, supra; Re id v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
776 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1989); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, supra; Gillmor 
v. Gillmor, 745 P. 2d 461 (Utah App., 1987) Cert. Den. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah, 1980). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The Utah Arbitration Act, §§78-3la-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
which Act is set forth verbatim in the Appendix to Appellee's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellant claimed the insurance program of the Davis County School 
District was discriminatory as applied to him. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant filed a Complaint against the School District with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division and received an adverse ruling. He then filed a Complaint 
against the School District in the District Court. After the School District filed a Motion 
to Dismiss with supporting Memorandum of Law, Appellant voluntarily dismissed the 
Complaint. He then attempted to invoke the School District "Grievance Procedure". 
When the School District refused to enter into a grievance procedure, Appellant filed a 
Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The District Court granted the School District's Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellee School District is a political subdivision of the State 
of Utah organized and operating as a public school system pursuant to the constitutional 
and statutory provisions applicable to school districts within the State of Utah. [R-51] 
2. The School District operates approximately seventy-five schools and 
special facilities and employs approximately 4,500 people. There are approximately 230 
married couples with both spouses working for the School District. The Appellant is an 
employee of the School District whose spouse is also employed by the District. [R-52] 
3. Prior to November 1, 1990, employees with a spouse also employed 
by the District were allowed "internal coordination" of benefits for the entire family if 
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one employed spouse carried single coverage and the other employed spouse carried 
family coverage. Beginning November 1, 1990, both employed spouses were required 
to carry family coverage in order to have internal coordination of benefits for the entire 
family.1 As a result of internal coordination, a study and analysis by the District and 
its insurance advisor indicated that for the married couples where both spouses elected 
to have family coverage, the District was paying a disproportionately higher premium for 
the dollar value being received for the "second" policy. The District paid 85% of the 
premium cost of the designated insurance plan to the insurance company for each of its 
employees, including both spouses of married couples. [R-52, 53] 
4. By requiring that one spouse be considered a "dependent", studies 
indicated that the same coverage and medical benefits would be available to both spouses 
and their family members without having to pay the full rate for the "second" policy. 
Therefore, with no reduction in medical insurance benefits, the District would be able 
to save approximately $250,000.00 annually. [R-53] 
5. As a result of this review and analysis, beginning November 1, 1992, 
following a process of collective bargaining with the Davis Education Association, the 
Davis Classified Association and supported by the Insurance Committee of the District, 
the so-called Insurance Coordination Program was eliminated. [R-53] 
The term "internal coordination of benefits" means coverage under two or more group insurance 
policies offered the employees by the same employer. 
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6. Following elimination of the Insurance Coordination for Married 
Couples, one spouse was to be designated by the married couple as the "employee" for 
insurance purposes and the other spouse was considered as a dependent. If the married 
couple did not designate who was considered the employee, the District put the coverage 
under either: 
A. The most comprehensive program selected. For example, if one spouse 
chose "family coverage" and the other chose "employee only", coverage 
would be provided under the spouse who elected family coverage; or, 
B. The program selected by the spouse whose birthday fell first within the 
calendar year. [R-53, 54] 
7. The District pays 85 % of the health insurance premium cost for the 
designated plan for all employees, except married couples. For married couples, the 
District pays 100% of the premium cost for the designated plan, [R-54] 
8. If the married couple has a change in status of the "employee" spouse, 
(for example, divorce, death, reduction in hours), resulting in no coverage, the 
"dependent" spouse is able to enroll as a covered "employee" without meeting physical 
examination or pre-existing condition requirements, assuming that there has not been a 
break in coverage. For example, if one spouse is designated as the "employee" and the 
other spouse is a "dependent", and the dependent spouse develops a condition which 
should be described as a "pre-existing condition" during the coverage, and the parties 
subsequently divorce or the other "employee" spouse dies, the pre-existing condition 
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requirements would not apply and the "dependent" spouse would continue to have 
coverage. The "dependent" spouse would then become the "employee" designated to 
carry the coverage. [R-54, 55] 
9. On November 10, 1992, Appellant filed a complaint in the Office of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter 
"UADD"). The UADD assigned the case to an Investigator to investigate the claims and 
to attempt to resolve the claims or make a determination in accordance with the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, §34-35-7. l(l)-(5). This procedure resulted in a 
UADD "Determination" and "Order" of "No Reasonable Cause". [R-55, 261] 
10. The School District was required to respond to the allegations by 
providing information and legal memoranda and argument. [R-261] 
11. The final two paragraphs of the Determination gave notice that 
Appellant had the option of review by requesting a hearing pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §63-46b-12(l)(a) within thirty (30) days or by requesting reconsideration 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-13 within thirty (30) days. [R-55] 
12. Appellant did not request either a hearing or reconsideration within 
thirty (30) days. Simultaneously, the UADD Director issued an Order based on the 
findings in the Determination. This "Order" also gave notice of the option to request a 
formal hearing within thirty (30) days, see Exhibit "A". No request was made by 
Appellant. [R-56] 
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13. Appellant was a member of the Davis Education Association at the 
time the Professional Agreement was negotiated and adopted. Appellant signed a 
Membership Enrollment Form. The Membership Enrollment Form contains a provision 
which states: 
I hereby designate and empower the local association 
(DEA) as my exclusive bargaining agent. [R-56, 261] 
14. On April 28, 1993, Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court 
of Davis County under the case of Reed et als. v. Davis County School District, et als., 
case number 930700114CN. [R-56] 
15. The April 28, 1993 Complaint raised the same issues as those which 
had been presented to and ruled upon previously by the UADD. [R-262] 
16. The School District responded to that Complaint by filing a Motion 
to Dismiss supported by a seventeen (17) page Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss. [R-56, 262] 
17. On May 17, 1993, Appellant's representative, Executive Director of 
the American Federation of Teachers, filed a request with the School District to receive 
certain information in accordance with the Government Records Access and Management 
Act (GRAMA). [R-56, 57] 
18. Thereafter, on June 22, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice of Dismissal 
under Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R-57] 
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19. The School District spent considerable time and approximately 
$20,000.00 in expense defending Appellant's UADD Charge, the lawsuit filed by 
Appellant, and in providing a response to Appellant's GRAMA request. [R-57, 263] 
20. The issues raised in the Plaintiff's UADD Charge and again in Reed 
et als. v. Davis County School District et als,, are the same issues which Appellant now 
seeks to have arbitrated. [R-57] 
21. Appellant initiated this action under the provisions of the Utah 
Arbitration Act, §§78-31a-l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by filing a Verified 
Motion to Compel Arbitration. [R-256] 
22. The Appellant contends that the "Grievance Procedure" of Article V 
of the Professional Agreement entered into between the Davis County School District and 
the Davis Education Association require arbitration and that the process is therefore 
subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act. [R-256] 
23. The School District responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss 
contending that Article V does not even mention the term "arbitration" and is not an 
arbitration provision and that it is not covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, or in the 
alternative that if Article V is covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, that Plaintiff has 
waived his right to arbitration thereunder. [R-256, 257] 
24. The Professional Agreement entered into by the Davis Education 
Association and the Davis County School District provides in Article V thereof for a 
Grievance Procedure, [R-257] 
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25. In Article V a grievance is defined as: 
"A complaint by an educator or educators in Davis School 
District that there may have been a violation, 
misinterpretation or inequitable application of any provision 
in this agreement or other policies relating to the terms and 
conditions of their employment." [R-257, The entire 
Professional Agreement is contained in Appendix to Brief 
of Appellant/Plaintiff. Article V, entitled "Grievance 
Procedure" begins on p. 50] 
26. Appellant was aware of the Grievance Procedure set forth in Article 
V of the Professional Agreement. [R-261] 
27. The Davis Education Association (DEA) entered into the Professional 
Agreement with the Davis County School District on August 18, 1992. [R-260] 
28. On May 28, 1993, some eight months after Appellant first raised the 
issue, and after having submitted the matter to UADD, with an unfavorable result, and 
after having filed a Complaint and served the same on the School District, the Appellant 
took his first step to attempt to invoke the Grievance Procedure provided for in Article 
V of the Professional Agreement. [R-262] 
29. The School District refused to submit the matter to the Grievance 
Procedure and the Appellant filed this action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Utah 
Arbitration Act. [R-263] 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The School District and the Davis Education Association negotiated a 
Professional Agreement containing Article V entitled "Grievance Procedure". The 
Grievance Procedure expresses the intent of the parties, is not ambiguous and contains 
no reference to arbitration. The District Court erred in finding that the Grievance 
Procedure was an arbitration agreement. This was contrary to the intent of the parties 
to the Professional Agreement. 
Months before filing a grievance under the Professional Agreement, 
Appellant filed Complaints with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and in the District 
Court. This action prejudiced the School District and constitutes a waiver of whatever 
right Appellant may have had to pursue a grievance proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING 
THAT THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE CONTAINED 
IN ARTICLE V OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DAVIS EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION AND THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION ACT. 
The Professional Agreement between the Davis County School District and 
the Davis Education Association is a contract between those parties. It was created 
through a process of bargaining and negotiation. Its written provisions memorialize the 
"meeting of the minds" between the two organizations which formulated and created it. 
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The parties bargained for and created a "Grievance Procedure" as set forth in Article V 
of the Professional Agreement. Appellant claims to derive an arbitration "right" from 
the "Grievance Procedure" and yet the words "arbitrate" or "arbitration" are nowhere to 
be found in the Grievance Procedure. As noted by the District Court, "....the terms 
'arbitration' and 'grievance procedure' are not synonymous" [Findings of Fact, Finding 
No. 9; R-258]. Nevertheless, the District Court found that the parties intended the 
Grievance Procedure to be an arbitration agreement. The Professional Agreement 
contains absolutely no provision which supports the conclusion that the parties intended 
to enter into any agreement which provided for an arbitration process. Exactly the 
opposite is, in fact, true. The parties knew the difference between a grievance process 
and arbitration. If they had wanted to provide for arbitration, they would have so stated 
in the Professional Agreement. It is pointedly relevant that the parties designated the 
procedures contained in Article V as "Grievance Procedure" and not as an arbitration 
process. If they had intended to provide for arbitration, why would they have called it 
"grievance" instead of "arbitration"? 
The District Court found that the provisions set forth in Article V of the 
Professional Agreement" appear to be a combination of procedures which are typical 
of a grievance procedure and also those which are typical of an arbitration provision". 
[Findings of Fact No. 12; R-259] The District Court further found that it was the 
general attitude of the courts and the purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act to encourage 
procedures which foster methods of dispute resolution and reduce costs and the time 
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associated with formal litigation [Findings of Fact No. 14; R-259] and "to hold that the 
provisions of Article V of the Professional Agreement do not constitute arbitration as 
contemplated by the Utah Arbitration Act would be to put form above substance and 
frustrate the obvious intent of the Legislature and would fly in the face of sound judicial 
reasoning". [Findings of Fact No. 14, 15; R-259] The Court held that the provisions 
of Article V of the Professional Agreement are an arbitration agreement subject to the 
Utah Arbitration Act. [Findings of Fact No. 16; R-259] These are findings of the 
District Court which should be reviewed for correctness and no deference should be 
accorded to such findings. 
There was no basis or reason to support the District Court's Finding and 
Judgment that the Grievance Procedure was intended to be an arbitration agreement. The 
issue does not turn upon what the intent of the Legislature was in adopting the Utah 
Arbitration Act. The intent of the Legislature is irrelevant in this context. What is 
relevant is what the intent of the parties was in entering into the Professional Agreement 
which included Article V entitled "Grievance Procedure". There was no reason for the 
District Court to speculate as to what the parties to the Professional Agreement intended. 
In interpreting a Contract, the Court should first look to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties, Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah 
App. 1994), Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah, 1989), 
Atlas Corporation v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah, 1987), Stanger v. 
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Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah, 1983). As the 
Supreme Court stated in Stanger: 
To preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent 
of the parties to a written integrated contract should be 
found within the four corners of that instrument. 
669P.2datp . 1205. 
If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the agreement, Winegar 
v. FroererCorp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah, 1991). 
The use of extrinsic evidence, in this case the District Court's speculation, 
is permitted only if the document appears incompletely to express the parties' agreement 
or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement, Wade v. Stangl, supra, Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt v. Blomquist, supra, Atlas Corporation v. Clovis National Bank, 
supra, Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah, 1985). In this case, the 
Grievance Procedure is complete within its "four corners" and does not appear 
incompletely to express the intention and agreement of the parties. Furthermore, the 
Grievance Procedure is not ambiguous. It contains a full and complete grievance process 
and there was no reason or basis for the District Court to conclude that when the parties 
said they wanted to have a Grievance Procedure, what they really meant and intended 
was that they wanted to have an arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration 
Act. 
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The Utah Arbitration Act specifically requires as a prerequisite to 
arbitration a showing that there exists a "written arbitration agreement", §78-3la-3, §78-
31a-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The intent of the parties should not be inferred or 
implied. The intention of the parties to submit their dispute to conclusive determination 
by a contractually designated agent, i.e. an arbitrator, should be made manifest by plain 
language, United States v. Moorman. 330 U.S. 457, 70 S.Ct. 288, 94 L.Ed. 256 (1950), 
State Highway Commission v. Brasel & Sims Construction Company, Inc., 688 P.2d 871 
(Wyoming, 1984). As observed, in the present case the words "arbitration" and 
"arbitrate" are not even used in the Grievance Procedure described in Article V of the 
Professional Agreement nor is there any reference to the Utah Arbitration Act. 
The Utah Arbitration Act provides procedures through which parties may 
require arbitration of a dispute. Where an arbitration agreement exists, the Court shall 
order the parties to arbitrate. However, §78-3la-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
specifically states: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable 
[Emphasis added.] 
No such written agreement exists. 
Appellant bases his claim to arbitration on Article V of the Professional 
Agreement. That Article outlines the grievance procedure to be followed when a 
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professional employee feels aggrieved. However, Article V makes no mention 
whatsoever of any right to arbitration or any other right which could be construed as 
such. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon considered circumstances very similar to 
those now presented to the Court. In the case of Van Eck v. Oregon State Employees 
Association, 574 P.2d 633 (Oregon, 1978), the Court held: 
It is elementary that an agreement by parties for the 
"arbitration" of a controversy necessarily involves an 
agreement to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final 
and binding on both parties. [Citing authorities.] This is 
also implicit in the terms of ORS 33.210, in providing that 
'[a] 11 persons desiring to settle by arbitration any 
controversy' may 'submit their differences to the award * 
* * of any person or persons mutually selected' and also by 
the terms of ORS 33.310 in providing for entry of a 
judgment based upon such an arbitration award. 
The contract provision in this case does not provide for an 
award that is final and binding on both parties. Instead, it 
provides that the "action of the Appeal Board shall be final 
and binding on the Association." Because the employee 
involved is not also bound by such "action," but is free to 
seek any other available remedy, it follows that this 
contract provision is not an agreement for arbitration within 
the terms of ORS 33.210. It also follows that the trial 
court did not err in finding that this grievance and appeal 
procedure did not "fit" the "true definition of arbitration" 
and in refusing to consider plaintiffs complaint as a 
proceeding under ORS 33.230 to enforce an agreement for 
arbitration. [Emphasis in original.] 
In the present case, Step 3 of the Grievance Procedure found in §5.4 of 
the Professional Agreement provides that the educator may submit the grievance to a 
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hearing examiner. The language of Step 4 is determinative in view of Van Eck and the 
authorities cited therein. Step 4 reads: 
If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in 
Step 3, the educator and/or his/her chosen representative 
may request and be granted a hearing before the Board of 
Education in executive session. Following an executive 
session the Board will render its decision in an open 
meeting. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the 
right of the District or the educator to appeal to an 
appropriate court of law. [Emphasis added.] 
Therefore, it is impossible under elementary rules of law to consider the 
Grievance Procedure provided for in Article V as an "arbitration" process. In order to 
have an arbitration process, both parties must agree that the decision of the arbitrator will 
be final and binding. Step 4 makes it clear that if the educator is not satisfied with the 
decision rendered in Step 3, that he/she has a right to appeal and be granted a hearing 
before the Board of Education which is not obliged to accept the decision of the "hearing 
examiner". Furthermore, Step 4 also provides that under the Article V Grievance 
Procedure, either the educator or the School District has a right to appeal to an 
appropriate court of law. These procedures outlined in Step 4 are fundamentally 
incompatible with the concept of arbitration. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act are completely 
irrelevant to Appellant's claim and he has no legal basis, right or authority to seek a 
remedy under the provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act. The decision of the District 
Court should be reversed on this issue. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS PARTICIPATED IN 
PRIOR LEGAL ACTIONS TO A POINT 
INCONSISTENT WITH INTENT TO 
ARBITRATE, RESULTING IN 
PREJUDICE TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
AND AS A RESULT, APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED WHATEVER RIGHT, IF ANY, 
HE MAY H A V E H A D TO 
ARBITRATION. 
In Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan. 857 P.2d 935 (Utah, 
1993), the Court specifically upheld and approved Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 
61 P.2d 308 (Utah, 1936) and American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445 
P.2d 1 (Utah, 1968). Based on those earlier cases, Soter's. Inc. specifically reiterated 
the three elements necessary to show waiver. They are: 
1. An existing right, benefit or advantage. 
Whatever rights Appellant may have had, he knew what they were because 
they were fully outlined and set forth in writing in the Professional Agreement. 
The second element is: 
2. Knowledge of the existence of such right benefit or advantage. 
For the reasons just stated, Appellant was well-aware of whatever rights 
he may have had. 
The third element is: 
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3. An intention to relinquish the right. 
There is, of course, no written statement from Appellant saying "I hereby 
relinquish my right". However, such explicitness is not required by the law. Soter's, 
Inc. held, citing Phoenix, that any waiver "must be distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied" [emphasis added]. In assessing whether or not waiver has occurred, 
Soter's, Inc. also stated that: 
In other words, we indicated that a fact finder should 
assess the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether the relinquishment is clearly intended. 
[Emphasis added.] Citing Parks v. Zions First National 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah, 1983), Morgan v. Ouailbrook 
Condominium, Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah, 1985) and 
Barnard v. Wassermann, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 855 P.2d 
243 (Utah, 1993). 
What are the "totality of the circumstances" in this case? To paraphrase 
the language of the Court in American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, supra, 
through no tortuous process of reasoning can we conclude that Appellant's actions did 
not imply a waiver of his right to file a grievance. Appellant's bargaining agent, the 
Davis Education Association, entered into a Professional Agreement with the School 
District on August 18, 1992. The insurance program which Appellant complains of was 
included in that Professional Agreement. The Professional Agreement also included 
Article V, entitled "Grievance Procedure". Appellant made no effort to file a Grievance 
Procedure. Instead, on November 10, 1992, he filed a Complaint with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division (UADD). On March 24, 1993 the UADD issued a 
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"Determination" and "Order" finding and ruling against Appellant and indicating that 
there was "No Reasonable Cause" for his Complaint. On April 28, 1993, Appellant filed 
a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County under the case name of Reed et als. 
v. Davis County School District et als.. Case No. 930700114CN. The School District 
responded to the Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss with a Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities dated May 4, 1993. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By this time, including 
Administrator's time, secretarial time and attorney's fees, the School District had 
expended in excess of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) defending against the 
claims which Appellant had filed with UADD and the Complaint which he had filed in 
the District Court. Then, on May 21, 1993, for the first time, Appellant submitted a 
letter to the School District seeking to invoke a Step 1 grievance procedure in accordance 
with the Professional Agreement. Therefore, Appellant's first attempt to invoke the 
Grievance Procedure came more than nine (9) months after the Professional Agreement 
with its insurance program was adopted, more than six (6) months after he filed his 
Complaint with UADD, and nearly one (1) month after filing his first lawsuit in the 
District Court. Also see National Foundation for Cancer Research v. A. G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 261 U.S. App. D.C. 284 and S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A. 
J. TaftCoalCo.,Inc. 906 F.2d 1057, cert. den. 112 L.Ed 2d 669 as to issue of wavier. 
Appellant is not unlike the Plaintiff in Barnard v. Wassermann, supra, in 
that he voluntarily relinquished his right to file a grievance and chose to file with UADD 
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and with the District Court. Like Barnard, he chose to "take care of it in another way" 
rather than to file a grievance. 
In view of these facts, it is clear that the School District has been 
prejudiced by Appellant's actions. 
Grievance procedures are established by parties exactly for the purpose of 
avoiding time and expense such as Appellant has caused himself and the School District 
to incur. If he had initiated the Grievance Procedure machinery after the 1992-1993 
Professional Agreement was adopted on August 18, 1992, or at least had used it before 
filing with UADD, the issues could possibly have been resolved. The Grievance 
Procedure may have resulted in a hearing before the Board of Education and a solution 
may have been arrived at by the Board. We can only speculate now as to what might 
have occurred if Appellant had utilized the Grievance Procedure, because he chose to 
ignore that procedure completely. As stated in Barnard v. Wassermann, supra: 
Barnard argues that he did not waive his objections to 
Judge Murphy's Order when he declined a hearing and 
chose to pursue the matter in a different way. 
Instead, he voluntarily relinquished the pre-deprivation 
process offered to him prior to entry of the Order when he 
rejected the opportunity to have a hearing on his 
objections. 
Barnard's request for a hearing on his objections indicates 
his knowledge of his constitutional rights. We presume 
that as an attorney, Barnard was aware of the consequences 
of his decision to pursue alternative channels to air his 
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objections. Furthermore, his desire to take care of the 
matter "in another way" suggests that he considered the 
various means of voicing his objections and chose a legal 
remedy other than the requested hearing. However, by so 
choosing, he waived his right to further consideration of 
those claims. 
Similarly, by rejecting the Grievance Procedure provided for in the 
Professional Agreement and choosing to handle the matter "in another way", that is by 
filing with UADD and in the District Court, Appellant has waived any claim to invoke 
the Grievance Procedure at this late date. Appellant's chosen course of conduct is 
certainly inconsistent with an intent to utilize the grievance process. 
As noted in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah, 
1992) the policies favoring arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration 
is not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the expense necessary to 
prepare a case for trial. Appellant shopped his case in two forums prior to filing his 
Complaint in this case and he caused the School District to incur substantial expense in 
the defense of the prior actions. 
The School District has spent a lot of time and money on this matter which 
may have been avoided if Appellant had tried to use the grievance process earlier. The 
totality of the circumstances inescapably leads to the conclusion that Mr. Reed chose his 
forum, tried to make his case there, failed to do so, and now tries to fall back on the 
grievance process, which he could have pursued in the first place. 
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With respect to the issue of the Affidavits which Appellant claims were 
improperly received by the District Court, Appellant has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by their receipt. In fact, Appellant has admitted in his Statement of Facts all 
elements upon which the District Court based its decision that Appellant waived whatever 
right, if any, he may have had to engage in arbitration. For example, Appellant admits 
that in November, 1992, he filed a Complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division 
and received an unfavorable ruling (Appellant's Brief, p. 5); that on April 28, 1993, 
Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County against the Davis 
County School District (Appellant's Brief, p. 6); that on May 17, 1993, Appellant's 
representative asked the School District for certain information under the Government 
Records Access Management Act (Appellant's Brief, p. 6); that on May 21, 1993, 
Appellant requested a formal grievance in compliance with the 1992-1993 Professional 
Agreement (Appellant's Brief, p. 7); that on June 4, 1993, the School District filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Appellant's First Complaint and that on June 22, 1993, Appellant 
voluntarily dismissed his Complaint after the School District had filed a Motion to 
Dismiss (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 9). 
The Affidavit of Mel Miles, Director of Human Resources of the School 
District (R. 164-170, Appellee's Appendix) was made on the basis of personal 
knowledge, with the exception of one statement upon information and belief to the effect 
that Appellant was a member of the Davis Education Association when the Professional 
Agreement was negotiated. This statement has never been denied. All other statements 
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pertaining to the matter, including the time and expense incurred by the School District 
in responding to Appellant's charges before the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
the District Court were made by Mr. Miles in his Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. He would have been competent to testify as to those matters. 
In a case involving submission of Affidavits, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah, 1993): 
The objectionable statements consist of legal arguments and 
conclusions and did nothing more than supplement the 
arguments made in plaintiff's memorandum. We fail to see 
how this prejudiced defendants. 
854 P.2d at p. 533 
In the present case, Appellant was not prejudiced or harmed by the 
Affidavits because either: (1) Appellant has included the same statements in his 
statement of facts, (2) statements contained in the Affidavits did nothing more than 
supplement the arguments made by the School District, or (3) the statements in the 
Affidavits were made on the basis of personal knowledge. Even if the District Court 
should not have refused to strike the Affidavits, this was a harmless error. By 
Appellant's own admission, the facts relevant to this Appeal are undisputed and Appellant 
does not rely on the District Court's consideration of matters outside the pleadings as a 
primary basis for his appeal, (Appellant's Brief, p. 13, footnote 10). The question of the 
Affidavits is really a non-issue which should have no bearing on the outcome of this 
Appeal. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The Professional Agreement contains Article V which describes a 
"Grievance Procedure". There is no use or mention of the term "arbitrate" or 
"arbitration". The Grievance Procedure described in the Professional Agreement cannot 
be considered an arbitration agreement because it lacks the essential legal requirements 
to constitute an arbitration agreement. In an arbitration agreement the parties agree that 
a matter will be submitted to an arbitrator and that the arbitrator's decision will be final. 
The Article V Grievance Procedure provides in Step 3 that the grievance may be 
submitted to a hearing examiner. However, if the educator is not satisfied with the 
decision of the hearing examiner, an appeal may be taken to the Board of Education and 
thereafter either party may "appeal to an appropriate court of law". (Appendix to Brief 
of Plaintiff/Appellant, tab "A", page 51). The process outlined in the Grievance 
Procedure is fundamentally different from and in conflict with the concept of an 
arbitration agreement. The Judgment of the District Court on this point should be 
reviewed for legal correctness and this court should find that the School District and the 
Davis Education Association never intended the Grievance Procedure to be an arbitration 
agreement and that the Grievance Procedure is not an arbitration agreement. The 
Judgment of the District Court on this point should be overruled. 
With respect to the issue of wavier, if this Court finds that the Grievance 
Procedure does not constitute an arbitration agreement, the question of waiver becomes 
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moot. If this Court feels constrained, however, to hold that the Grievance Procedure is 
an arbitration agreement, then the Findings of Fact made by the District court should not 
be disturbed and this Court should hold that Appellant's actions prior to requesting a 
grievance proceeding were inconsistent with that process and that he had waived any 
right to pursue the matter by grievance or arbitration. The District Court's Judgment on 
that point should then be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June, 1994. 
KING & KING 
FELSHAW KING, Bfauire 
Attorneys for Appellefe/GfetfS-Appellant 
Davis County School District 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE, postage prepaid, to: 
Terry E. Welch, Esquire 
Mark F. James, Esquire 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
DATED this 10th day of June, 1994. 
S:Reed.Bri 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
of 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY E. REED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 930700200CV 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
KING & KING 
LAWYERS 
330 NORTH MAIN 
PO BOX 320 
<AYSVILLE UTAH 84037 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be 
heard on Tuesday, October 12, 1993, on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge presiding. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by his legal counsel, Mark F. James, 
Esquire and Terry E. Welch, Esquire. Defendant appeared by 
Felshaw King, Esquire, legal counsel for the Davis County 
School District. The Court heard the oral arguments of 
Counsel for both parties and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court fully and carefully considered all of the 
pleadings on file herein, the Memoranda of Law submitted by 
the parties and the oral arguments of the parties and based 
thereon issued the Court's Ruling dated November 9, 1993. 
As directed by the Court in its Ruling, Counsel for 
Defendant thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and accompanying Judgment. Counsel for 
Plaintiff responded by filing an "Objection to Proposed 
Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law", "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss" and "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss". The Defendant then 
filed "School District Response to Objection to Proposed 
Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law", "Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Ruling 
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" and "Defendant's Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider". 
The Court reviewed and considered all of the 
aforementioned pleadings and issued a "Ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" 
dated December 29, 1993 in which Ruling Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider was denied. 
Thereafter, Defendant submitted revised proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a revised proposed 
Judgment. Plaintiff again filed an "Objection to Proposed 
Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law" with a Memorandum. Defendant responded with a "Response 
to Objection" and a Memorandum. 
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The Court reviewed and considered all of the 
pleadings regarding the second Objection and issued a "Ruling 
on Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment" dated January 31, 1994 in 
which Plaintiff's Objections were denied and Defendant's 
Counsel was directed to submit the original Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment to the Court for signature. 
The Court now being fully advised in the premises 
does hereby make and enter its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff initiated this action under the 
provisions of the Utah Arbitration Act, §§78-31a-l, et sea. , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by filing a Verified Motion to 
Compel Arbitration. 
2. The Plaintiff contends that the provisions of 
Article V of the Professional Agreement entered into between 
the Davis County School District and the Davis Education 
Association require arbitration and that the process is 
therefore subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration 
Act. 
3. Defendant responded by filing a Motion to 
Dismiss contending that since Article V does not mention the 
term "arbitration" it is not strictly an arbitration provision 
and that it is not covered by the Utah Arbitration Act, or in 
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the alternative that if Article V is covered by the Utah 
Arbitration Act, that Plaintiff has waived his right to 
arbitration thereunder. 
4. The Professional Agreement entered into by the 
Davis Education Association and the Davis County School 
District provides in Article V thereof, for a Grievance 
Procedure. 
5. In Article V a grievance is defined as: 
"a complaint by an educator or educators 
in Davis School District that there may 
have been a violation, misinterpretation 
or inequitable application of any 
provision in this agreement or other 
policies relating to the terms and 
conditions of their employment. 
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6. The Grievance Procedure referred to in Article 
V requires that the aggrieved person first discuss the matter 
informally with his/her principal; if not thereby resolved, 
the person may then invoke a formal grievance procedure. This 
formal procedure involves a written grievance signed and dated 
by the complainant. It requires a meeting with the principal 
and a written decision by the principal. If the person is not 
satisfied by that meeting, the grievance is forwarded to the 
superintendent and he is required to meet with the aggrieved 
person and to make a written decision. If the person is not 
satisfied with that decision, the person may request that the 
matter be submitted to a hearing examiner agreed to by the 
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parties. The hearing examiner will then make a recommendation 
to the Board of Education and the aggrieved person in an 
Executive Session. If the aggrieved person is not satisfied 
with that recommendation, the person may then request a 
hearing before the entire Board of Education in Executive 
Session. The Board of Education must then make a decision in 
an open meeting. 
7. Nothing in the Grievance Procedure shall be 
construed to limit the right of the School District or the 
grievant to appeal to an appropriate court of law if they are 
not satisfied with the decision of the Board of education. 
8. The Utah Arbitration Act does not define the 
term "arbitration". 
9. It is clear that the terms "arbitration" and 
"grievance procedure" are not synonymous. 
10. The term "grievance procedure" has to do 
primarily with the procedures for resolving complaints between 
employees and employer that contemplates a system of face-to-
face discussion between the employer and the employee to 
resolve a difference. 
11. The term "arbitration" refers to a more formal 
quasi-judicial procedure of dispute resolution by an 
independent party agreed to by those involved. 
12 . The provisions as set forth in Article V of the 
Professional Agreement appear to be a combination of 
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procedures which are typical of a grievance procedure and also 
those which are typical of an arbitration provision. 
13 . It was the intent of the Board of Education and 
the Davis Education Association to set up a procedure 
regarding allegations of violation, misrepresentation or 
inequitable application of the provisions of the Professional 
Agreement or other policies relating to the terms and 
conditions of their employment as an alternate to legal 
proceedings. 
14. The general attitude of the Courts and the 
obvious purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act is to encourage 
those procedures which foster methods of dispute resolution 
which reduce the costs and the time associated with formal 
litigation. 
15. To hold that the provisions of Article V of the 
Professional Agreement do not constitute arbitration as 
contemplated by the Utah Arbitration Act would be to put form 
above substance and frustrate the obvious intent of the 
Legislature and would fly in the face of sound judicial 
reasoning. 
16. The provisions of Article V of the Professional 
Agreement are an arbitration agreement and are subject to the 
Utah Arbitration Act. 
17. Utah courts have defined waiver as the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
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18. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence and 
an intention to relinquish it. 
19. The intent to extinguish a right must be 
distinct. 
20. In deciding the issue of waiver, the court need 
only determine whether the totality of the circumstance 
warrants the inference of relinquishment. 
21. In applying the concept of waiver to 
arbitration clauses, Utah courts have expanded on that concept 
somewhat by requiring not only a finding of intent to 
relinquish the right to arbitrate, but also that the other 
party has been prejudiced thereby, 
22. Prejudice to the other party may be shown, 
among other things, by an additional advantage to the 
requesting party by participating in pre-trial procedures or 
similar activities; by forum shopping (where the party has 
previously submitted the matter to the discretionary powers of 
a court) ; or by causing the other party to spend time and 
resources that the arbitration procedure is designed to limit 
or eliminate. 
23. In the matter here in dispute, the Davis 
Education Association (DEA) entered into the Professional 
Agreement with the Davis County School District on August 18, 
1992. 
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24. The Plaintiff herein was a member of the DEA 
and appointed the DEA as his bargaining agent and ratified the 
Professional Agreement. 
25. Plaintiff was aware of the Grievance Procedure 
set forth in Article V of the Professional Agreement. 
26. By letter dated September 19, 1992, addressed 
to the School District Superintendent, Plaintiff expressed 
concern over the health care provision which he claimed was 
discriminatory against married couples working for the School 
District. 
27. Subsequently, on November 10, 1992, Plaintiff, 
along with certain other employees, filed a Complaint with the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) claiming that the 
health insurance benefit plan of the School District was 
discriminatory based on marital status, sex, and gender by 
association. 
28. The School District was required to respond to 
said allegations by providing information and legal memoranda 
and argument. 
29. After considering the facts and the legal 
arguments, UADD issued a Determination adverse to the 
Plaintiff on March 24, 1993. 
30. On April 28, 1993 Plaintiff filed a Complaint 
against the Davis County School District, et als., in the 
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, designated as 
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Civil No. 93 0700114 and had a Summons and copy of the 
Complaint served on the School District. 
31. The Complaint alleged, among other things, 
violation of the "Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act" , §§34-35-1, et 
seq. , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the Utah Constitution 
claiming unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender, 
gender by association and marital status. 
32. The April 28, 1993, Complaint raised the same 
issues as those which had been presented to and ruled upon 
previously by the UADD. 
33. The School District responded to the Complaint 
by filing a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum of Law in 
support of the Motion to Dismiss. 
34. On May 28, 1993, some eight months after 
Plaintiff first raised the issue, and after having submitted 
the matter to UADD, with an unfavorable result, and after 
having filed a Complaint and served the same on the School 
District, the Plaintiff took his first step to attempt to 
invoke the Grievance Procedure provided for in Article V of 
the Professional Agreement. 
35. On June 22, 1993, after Defendant had responded 
to Plaintiff's Complaint in the District Court with a Motion 
to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law, the Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed his Complaint in the District Court. 
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36. The School District, up to that point, had 
expended monies to the extent of $20,000.00 to respond to the 
allegations of the Plaintiff before the UADD and the District 
Court. 
37. The School District refused to submit the 
matter to the Grievance Procedure and the Plaintiff filed this 
action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Utah Arbitration 
Act. 
38. The Plaintiff, by filing his Complaint with 
UADD and receiving a disfavorable recommendation, by then 
filing a Complaint in the District Court raising the same 
issues and by waiting some eight months after the dispute 
arose before attempting to invoke the Grievance Procedure has 
shown a clear intent to pursue a remedy by alternative means. 
39. The actions of Plaintiff have prejudiced the 
Defendant, Davis County School District. 
40. Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit of 
Mr. Mel Miles should be denied. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
does now make and enter its Conclusions of Law as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit of 
Mr. Mel Miles should be denied. 
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2. Plaintiff's first and second Objections to 
Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law should be denied. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider should be 
denied. 
4. The provisions of Article V of the Professional 
Agreement constitute an arbitration agreement which is subject 
to the Utah Arbitration Act. 
5. That Plaintiff has waived his right to 
arbitration in this matter. 
6. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be 
granted with prejudice. 
Let Judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this 3 r <^ day of February, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY a j PAGE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW to: 
Terry E. Welch, Esquire 
Mark F. James, Esquire 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
postage prepaid, this ^ day of February, 1994. 
Secretary 
S:Reed.fof 
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BY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
of 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY E. REED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 930700200CV 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
KING & KING 
LAWYERS 
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P.O. BOX 320 
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly to be 
heard by the Court on Tuesday, October 12, 1993, on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss with the Honorable Rodney S. Page, 
District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by his attorneys, Mark F. James, Esquire, 
and Terry E. Welch, Esquire. Defendant was represented by 
its attorney Felshaw King, Esquire. At that time the Court 
heard the oral arguments of Counsel for the respective 
parties and took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, 
the Court duly considered all of the pleadings, memoranda, 
and oral arguments of the parties and issued its ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated November 9, 1993. 
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As directed by the Court in its Ruling, Counsel 
for Defendant thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and accompanying Judgment. Counsel 
for Plaintiff responded by filing an "Objection to Proposed 
Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law", "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss" and "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss". The Defendant 
then filed "School District Response to Objection to 
Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law", "Objections to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" and 
"Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to 
Reconsider". 
The Court reviewed and considered all of the 
aforementioned pleadings and issued a "Ruling on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss" dated December 29, 1993 in which Ruling Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider was denied. 
Thereafter, Defendant submitted revised proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a revised 
proposed Judgment. Plaintiff again filed an "Objection to 
Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" with a Memorandum. Defendant responded 
with a "Response to Objection" and a Memorandum. 
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The Court reviewed and considered all of the 
pleadings regarding the second Objection and issued a 
"Ruling on Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment" dated January 31, 
1994 in which Plaintiff's Objections were denied and 
Defendant's Counsel was directed to submit the original 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to the 
Court for signature. 
The Court has made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the foregoing, and 
the Court now being fully advised in the premises and good 
cause appearing therefor, it is now hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to exclude the Affidavit 
of Mr. Mel Miles is denied. 
2. Plaintiff's first and second Objections to 
Proposed Judgment and to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are denied. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
4. The provisions of Article V of the 
Professional Agreement entered into between the Davis 
Education Association and the Davis County School District 
on August 18, 1992 constitute an arbitration agreement 
subject to the Utah Arbitration Act. 
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5. That Plaintiff has waived his right to 
arbitration in this matter. 
6. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be 
and the same is hereby granted with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of February, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
KrtL*** y) -4^ 
RODNEY SJ PAGE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to: 
Terry E. Welch, Esquire 
Mark F. James, Esquire 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
postage prepaid, this
 {J_^ day of February, 1994. 
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FELSHAW KING, Esquire (#1818) 
KING & KING 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 North Main Street 
P. 0. Box 320 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: (801) 543-2288 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Of 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY E. REED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MEL MILES, 
DIRECTOR OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES OF DAVIS 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Civil NO. 930700200CV 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
(ss. 
) 
KING & KING 
LAWYERS 
330 NORTH MAIN 
PO BOX 320 
KAYSVILLE UTAH 84037 
On the 8th day of October, 1993, personally 
appeared before me MEL MILES, Director of Human Resources of 
the Davis County School District, who after having been duly 
sworn upon his oath did depose and say: 
1. That Affiant is and for eight (8) years has 
been Director of Human Resources of the Davis County School 
District. 
2. That Affiant is personally acquainted with 
Gary Reed and the claim made by Mr* Reed et als. alleging 
that the medical insurance program of the Davis School 
District for the school year 1992-1993 was unlawfully 
discriminatory against married couples, both of whom were 
employed by the School District. 
3. On or about August 18, 1992 the Board of 
Education of Davis County School District entered into a 
"Professional Agreement" with the Davis Education 
Association for the 1992-93 school year. 
The Professional Agreement was formulated through 
a process of negotiation and includes the insurance program 
complained of in Plaintiff's Complaint. The insurance 
program is set forth in paragraph 4.2 of the Professional 
Agreement. 
4. The Board of Education has recognized the 
Davis Education Association as the exclusive representative 
for the professional employees for the term of the 
Professional Agreement, that is, for the 1992-93 school 
year. 
5. Affiant states upon information and belief 
that Mr. Reed was a member of the Davis Education 
Association (DEA) at the time the Professional Agreement was 
negotiated and adopted. Mr. Reed signed a Membership 
Enrollment Form with the DEA. The Membership Enrollment 
Form contains a provision which states: 
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I hereby designate and empower the local 
association (DEA) as my exclusive 
bargaining agent. 
6. Affiant is personally aware of the fact that 
Gary Reed et als. filed claims against the School District 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division, a Division of 
the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, on or about 
November 10, 1992, alleging that the insurance program of 
the School District was unlawfully discriminatory. 
7. Affiant is personally aware of the fact that 
many hours of time were spent by School District personnel 
in responding to the claims filed by Gary Reed et als. with 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and that a 
considerable amount of legal research and preparation was 
necessitated by such claims. 
8. Affiant is personally aware of the fact that 
all of the claims filed by Gary Reed et als. with the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Division were adjudged and adjudicated 
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division to be without merit 
and that all such claims were ordered dismissed. 
9. Affiant is further personally aware of the 
fact that Gary Reed et als. filed an action in the District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, against the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah, and the Davis School 
District alleging, inter aliaf that the Findings and 
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Decision of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division were 
erroneous. 
The School District was required to expend 
additional time and effort in connection with preparation of 
the defense of the action in District Court and such defense 
required additional legal research and the filing of a 
Motion to Dismiss accompanied by an extensive Memorandum of 
Law in Support of the School District's Motion to Dismiss. 
10. The School District's Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss raised several defenses to the 
Plaintiffs claim, including the defense of failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
11. It was not until after the School District 
filed its Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law that Gary 
Reed et als. filed a Notice of Dismissal in the District 
Court action. 
12. Affiant assisted in negotiating the 
Professional Agreement between the Board of Education of the 
Davis County School District and the Davis Education 
Association and is personally familiar with the contents and 
provisions of such Professional Agreement. 
13. The Professional Agreement does not contain 
any provision pertaining to arbitration. In fact, the 
Professional Agreement is a document consisting of 
approximately fifty (50) pages and the words "arbitration" 
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and "arbitrator" are not even used or contained in the 
Professional Agreement. 
14. The Professional Agreement contains Article 
V, entitled "Grievance Procedure". There is no provision in 
the Grievance Procedure for arbitration. The Board of 
Education retains ultimate authority for deciding any 
grievance filed under the terms of the Professional 
Agreement. 
15. The Davis School District does not now have, 
and to the best of my knowledge never has had, any 
agreement, written or otherwise, agreeing to submit any 
issue to arbitration or any process resembling arbitration. 
16. Mr. Reed's initial objection to the 
insurance program of the School District was filed under 
Step 1 of the Grievance Procedure on or about May 21, 1993, 
more than six (6) months after he filed his Complaint with 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. He followed with a 
Complaint in the District Court after an adverse ruling by 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. This Complaint was 
filed in April 28, 1993, nearly one (1) month before 
Plaintiff made his first effort to follow the Grievance 
Procedure. This all occurred approximately nine (9) 
months after the Professional Agreement was approved by Mr. 
Reed's bargaining agent. It was not until almost three 
(3) weeks after the School District filed a Motion to 
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Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in the District Court case 
that Mr. Reed attempted to follow the Grievance Procedure. 
17. As a result of the Complaints filed by Mr. 
Reed, the School District has been required to respond and 
in doing so has utilized the time of Dr. Richard E. Kendell, 
Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Stephen F. Ronnenkamp, 
Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Mr. Roger C. Glines, 
Business Administrator, Mr. Mel Miles, Director of Human 
Resources, Ms. Becky Robinson, Assistant Director of Human 
Resources, Mr. Richard Lemon, Director of Data Processing, 
and technicians and secretaries. The total time spent by 
the Administration is approximately 120 hours in connection 
with Mr. Reed's claims. The expense incurred by the School 
District in connection with Mr. Reed's claims, including the 
time of school administrators and personnel and legal fees, 
exceeds Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00). This time and 
expense includes meetings with Mr. Reed, responding to the 
claims filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
defending the first action filed by Mr. Reed in the District 
Court of Davis County. 
18. Further Affiant saith not. 
DATED the day and year first above written. 
MEL MALES £ 
KING & KING Director of Human Resources 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year 
first above written. 
/? 
(SEAIW 
PATRICIA K. BARBER 
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
251 EAST 200 SOUTH 
CLEARFIELD. UT 84037 
COMM. EXP. 12-16-96 
M Mtu— 
NOTARY PUBLIC , -
 / y / 
Residing at: ^^kLc'-^^y ll/^Y^ 
My Commission Expires: /^L- //• -J^* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MEL MILES, DIRECTOR OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES, to: 
Mark F. James, Esquire 
Terry E. Welch, Esquire 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys at Law 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
postage prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1993. 
&^*t>C*t __i!"~ * > < - -«•*•—** 
Secretary 
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(b) The bureau may only release identifying 
information to an adult adoptee or adult sibling 
when it receives requests from both the adoptee 
and his adult sibling 
(c) After matching the request of an adult 
adoptee with that of his adult sibling, if the bu-
reau has been provided with sufficient informa-
tion to make that match, the bureau shall notify 
both the adoptee and the adult sibling that the 
requests have been matched, and disclose the 
identifying information to those parties 
(3) Information registered with the bureau under 
this section is available only to a registered adult 
adoptee and his registered birth parent or registered 
adult sibling, under the terms of this section 
(4) Information regarding a birth parent who has 
not registered a request with the bureau may not be 
disclosed 
(5) The b u r e a u may charge a fee for services pro-
vided u n d e r th is section, l imited to t he cost of provid-
ing those services 1992 
78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of informa-
tion — Violations — Penalty. 
(1) Information maintained or filed with the bu-
reau under this chapter may not be disclosed except 
as provided by this chapter, or pursuant to a court 
order 
(2) Any person who discloses information obtained 
from the bureau's voluntary adoption registry in vio-
lation of this chapter, or knowingly allows that infor-
mation to be disclosed in violation of this chapter is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor 19$7 
CHAPTER 31 
ARBITRATION 
(Repealed by Laws 1986, ch. 128, ^ 1.) 
78-31-1 to 78-31-22. Repealed. 
78-31a-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known as the 
Act" 
'Utah Arbitration 
1985 
78-31a-2. Definitions. 
(1) "Arbitrators" means one or more arbitrators as 
appointed by the court or agreed upon by the parties 
(2) "Court" means any state district court in Utah 
1985 
78-31a-3. Arbitration agreement. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or fu 
ture controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law 
or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is 
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 1985 
78-3 la-4. Court order to arbitrate. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing 
the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order 
the parties to arbitrate If an issue is raised concern-
ing the existence of an arbitration agreement or the 
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the 
court shall determine those issues and order or deny 
arbitration accordingly 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the al-
leged arbitration agreement is involved in an action 
or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdic-
tion to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion 
shaU be made to that court Otherwise, the motion 
shall be made to a court with proper venue 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration 
stays any action or proceeding involving an issue sub-
ject to arbitration under the agreement However, if 
the issue is severable from the other issues in the 
action or proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitra-
tion is stayed If a motion is made in an action or 
proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a 
stay of the action or proceeding 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not 
be grounded on a claim that an issue subject to arbi 
tration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the 
claim have not been shown 1985 
CHAPTER 31a 
ARBITRATION ACT 
Section 
78-31a-l Short title 
78-31a-2 Definitions 
78-3la-3 Arbitration agreement 
78-31a-4 Court order to arbitrate 
78-3la-5 Appointment of arbitrators 
78-3la-6 Conference prior to arbitration hear-
ing 
78-31a-7 Arbitration hearing — Procedure 
78-3la-8 Arbitration hearing — Powers of arbi-
trators 
78-3 la-9 Arbitration hearing — Joinder of par-
ties 
78-31a-10 Arbitration award 
78-31a-ll Costs 
78-31a-12 Confirmation of award 
78-3la-13 Modification of award by arbitrators 
78-31a-14 Vacation of the award by court 
78 3la-15 Modification of award by court 
78-31a-16 Award as judgment 
78-31a-17 Motions 
78-3la-18 Location for arbitration 
78-31a-19 Appeals 
78-31a-20 Scope of chapter 
78-31a-5. Appointment of arbitrators. 
(1) If the arbitration agreement specifies a proce-
dure for appointment of arbitrators, it shall be fol-
lowed 
(2) If no procedure is specified, or if the agreed 
method fails or cannot be followed for any reason or 
if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party to 
the arbitration agreement may move the court to ap 
point one or more arbitrators, as necessarv 
(3) The motion shall state 
(a) the issues to be aibitrated, 
(b) any arbitrators the party may propose for 
appointment, and 
(c) the qualifications of any proposed arbitra 
tors 
(4) Upon this motion the court shall appoint the 
necessary arbitrators, whom the court shall find qual 
lfied to arbitrate the issues stated in the motion 198"> 
78-31a-6. Conference prior to arbitration hear-
ing. 
(1) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at 
the request of any party, may conduct a conference 
prior to the arbitration hearing The conference shall 
be held no fewer than ten days before the arbitration 
hearing Notice of the conference shall be made by 
certified mail to all parties to the arbitration hearing, 
and no fewer than ten days before the conference 
78-31a-7 JUDICIAL CODE 492 
(2) The subpoena powers provided in Section 
78-3la-8 apply to conferences conducted under this 
section 
(3) The conference shall allow the parties to con 
sider any matters which may aid in the disposition of 
the arbitration hearing, including, but not limited to 
(a) identifying and clarifying the issues, 
(b) determining the scope and scheduling of 
discovery of evidence under Section 78-3la-7, 
(c) stipulating to the admission of facts and 
documents, 
(d) identity of witnesses 
(4) The arbitrators shall make a written record of 
action taken at the conference, including a finding of 
any agreements made between the parties regarding 
matters discussed This finding controls at the arbi-
tration hearing, unless the arbitrators find that a 
modification at the hearing is necessary to prevent a 
manifest injustice 1985 
78-3la-7. Arbitration hearing — Procedure. 
(1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place 
for the arbitration hearing and serve each party to 
the proceeding with notice of the time and place, per-
sonally or by certified mail Notice shall be served not 
fewer than 30 days before the date of hearing, unless 
both parties stipulate to a waiver or modification of 
this notice requirement Appearance at the hearing 
waives the notice required by this section The arbi-
trators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as 
necessary, and on request of a party or upon their 
own motion may postpone the hearing to a date not 
later than the date fixed by the arbitration agree-
ment for making the award, unless the parties con-
sent to a later date The arbitrators shall hear and 
determine the controversy upon the evidence pro-
duced, notwithstanding that a party duly notified 
fails to appear The court upon motion may direct the 
arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and 
determination of the controversy 
(2) Each party to the arbitiation proceeding is enti-
tled, in person or through counsel, to be heard, to 
present evidence material to the controversy, and to 
cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing 
(3) The hearing shall be recorded in a manner 
agreed upon by the parties Costs of making a record 
shall be apportioned as directed by the arbitrators 
(4) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbi-
trators, but a simple majority of them may determine 
any questions and render a final award If during the 
course of the hearing an arbitrator for any reason 
ceases to act, the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators 
may continue the hearing and determination of the 
controversy, or additional arbitrators may be ap 
pointed as provided in Section 78 31a 5 
(5) Unless otherwise provided by the arbitration 
agreement or by law, the powers of the arbitratois 
are exercised by majority vote 1985 
78-3la-8. Arbitration hearing — Powers of arbi-
trators. 
(1) Arbitrators may administer oaths and issue 
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the pro 
duction of books, records, documents, and other evi-
dence Subpoenas shall be served, and upon motion to 
the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced as 
provided by law for the service and enforcement of 
subpoenas in civil actions 
(2) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at 
the request of any party, may order 
(a) a party to provide any other party with in-
formation which is determined by the arbitrator 
to be relevant to the determination of the issues 
to be arbitrated, or 
(b) the use of requests for discovery as pro-
vided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ex-
cept that the time a party has to respond to any 
discovery request shall be determined by the ar-
bitrators in their discretion 
(3) Any law compelling a person under subpoena to 
testify is applicable to this chapter 
(4) The same fees prescribed for the attendance of 
witnesses in civil actions shall be paid to witnesses 
subpoenaed in arbitration proceedings 1985 
78-3la-9. Arbitration hearing — Joinder of par-
ties. 
(1) Upon motion to the arbitration panel by any 
party, a person who is subject to service of process for 
the subject matter of the arbitration, and who is a 
party to the arbitration agreement, shall be joined as 
a party in the action if (a) in his absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those who are al-
ready parties, or (b) he claims or the motion alleges 
he has an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and the disposition of the action in his absence im-
pedes his ability to protect that interest, or subjects 
any of the persons already parties to a substantial 
risk of incurred multiple or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reasons of his claimed interest 
(2) Any person joined as a party to the arbitration 
has the same time to answer as was given to the 
initial! defendant in the case 1985 
78-31a-10. Arbitration award. 
(1) The arbitration award shall be in writing and 
signed by the arbitrators who join in the award A 
copy of the award shall be served upon each party 
personally, or by certified mail, or as otherwise pro-
vided by the arbitration agreement 
(2) An arbitration award shall be made within the 
time set by the agreement or if a time is not set, 
within a time the court orders pursuant to the motion 
of any party to the arbitration proceeding The par-
ties may at any time, by wntten agreement, extend 
the time for award A party to an arbitration proceed-
ing waives any objection based on the ground that the 
award was not timely rendered unless the arbitrators 
are notified of the objection before service of the 
award 1985 
78-31a-ll. Costs. 
The expenses fees, and other costs of the arbitra-
tors, exclusive of attorney s fees, shall be paid as pro-
vided in the award, unless another provision for the 
payment of fees is made in the arbitration agreement 
1985 
78-3la-12. Confirmation of award. 
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbi-
tration proceeding for the confirmation of the award, 
and 20 days notice to all parties, the court shall con-
firm the award unless a motion is timely filed to va-
cate or modify the award 1985 
78-31a-13. Modification of award by arbitra-
tors. 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the arbitrators or 
upon order of the court pursuant to a motion, the 
arbitrators may modify the award if 
(a) there is an evident miscalculation of fig-
ui*es or description of a person or property re-
ferred to in the award, 
(b) the award is imperfect as to form, or 
(c) necessary to clarify any part of the award 
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(2) A motion to the arbitrators for modification of 
an award shall be made within 20 days after service 
of the award upon the moving party Written notice 
that a motion has been made shall be promptly 
served personally or by certified mail upon all other 
parties to the proceeding The notice of motion for 
modification shall contain a statement that objections 
to the motion be served upon the moving party withi^ 
ten days after receipt of the notice Any award modi 
fied by the arbitrators is subject to the provisions of 
Sections 78-31a-ll, 78-31a-12, and 78-31a-14 i985 
78-3la-14. Vacation of the award by court. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the 
arbitration proceeding for vacation of the award, the 
court shall vacate the award if it appears 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or other undue means, 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral^ 
showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty of 
misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any 
party, 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the 
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused to 
hear evidence material to the controversy, or othu 
erwise conducted the hearing to the substantial 
prejudice of the rights of a party, or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement be 
tween the parties to the arbitration proceeding 
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to 
the court within 20 days after a copy of the award i$ 
served upon the moving party, or if predicated upor\ 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 
days after the grounds are known or should hav^ 
been known 
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than ir\ 
Subsection (l)(e), the court may order a rehearing 
before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbis 
tration agreement or by the court Arbitrators chosen 
by the court shall be found qualified to arbitrate th$ 
issues involved The time for making an award, if 
specified in the arbitration agreement, is applicable 
to a rearbitration proceeding If not specified, th$ 
court shall order the award upon rearbitration to b^ 
made within a reasonable time The time for making 
an award under a rearbitration proceeding corns 
mences on the date of the court's order fo*> 
rearbitration 
(4) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion, 
to modify or correct the award is pending, the court 
shall confirm the award 198$ 
78-31a-15. Modification of award by court. 
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy 
of the award is served upon the moving party, the 
court shall modify or correct the award if it appears 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of fig 
ures or an evident mistake in the description of 
any person or property referred to in the award, 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter 
not submitted to them, if the award can be cor 
rected without affecting the merits of the award 
upon the issues submitted, or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form 
(2) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify 
and correct the award and confirm it as modified and 
corrected Otherwise, the court shall deny the motion 
and confirm the award of the arbitrators 
(3) A motion to modify or correct an award may be 
joined in the alternative with a motion to vacate the 
award 1985 
78-3la-16. Award as judgment. 
An award which is confirmed, modified, or cor-
rected by the court shall be treated and enforced in 
all respects as a judgment Costs incurred incident to 
any motion authorized by this chapter, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded by the ar-
bitration agreement, may be awarded by the court 
1985 
78-31a-17. Motions. 
(1) Notice of an initial motion for an order of arbi-
tration shall be served as provided by law for the 
service of a summons, unless otherwise specified by 
the parties in the arbitration agreement 
(2) A motion to the court or the arbitrators shall be 
made and heard as provided by law for motions in 
civil actions, except as otherwise specified in this 
chapter 
(3) Notice in wr i t ing of t he mot ion sha l l be served 
on the adverse pa r ty as provided by law for civil ac-
tions 1985 
78-31a-18. Location for arbitration. 
If an arbitration agreement provides that arbitra-
tion be held in a specified county, the district court of 
that county has jurisdiction to hear the initial motion 
for arbitration If no provision is made, hearing on 
the initial motion for arbitration shall be before the 
district court of the county where the adverse party 
resides or has a place of business or, if the adverse 
party has no residence or place of business in this 
state, in the county in which the adverse party is 
served Unless the court with jurisdiction otherwise 
orders, all subsequent motions or hearings incident to 
the arbitration proceeding shall be heard by the court 
hearing the initial motion 1985 
78-31a-19. Appeals. 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as 
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from any 
court order 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration, 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration, 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an 
arbitration award, 
(4) modifying or correcting an award, or 
(5) vacating an award without directing 
rearbitration 1985 
78-31a-20. Scope of chapte r . 
This chapter is not intended to provide a means of 
arbitration exclusive of those sanctioned under com-
mon law 1985 
CHAPTER 31b 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Definitions 
Court authority and parties' participa-
tion 
Procedure for court referral 
Reporting of court ADR referrals 
ADR agreement enforcement 
Tolling of time requirements 
Confidentiality 
Liabilities of ADR provider 
bection 
78 31b-l 
78 31b-2 
78-31b-3 
78-31b-4 
78-31b-5 
78-31b-6 
78-31b-7 
78-31b-8 
78-31b-l. Definitions. 
(1) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution 
(2) "Arbitration" means the procedures in Title 78, 
Chapter 31a, Utah Arbitration Act 
